Introduction
On 24 July 2026, the NSW Supreme Court delivered its judgment in Smith v Blanch; Smith v Dennis [2026] NSWSC 879, concluding one of Australia’s most closely watched civil vilification appeals.
The case arose from a series of social media posts published by Kirralie Smith, spokesperson for Binary Australia (Gender Awareness Australia Ltd), during public debate about the participation of trans-identified males in women’s community football competitions in New South Wales. Stephanie Blanch and Riley Dennis, both trans-identified males competing in women’s football, alleged that the publications unlawfully incited hatred, serious contempt or severe ridicule because they are transgender, contrary to the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW).
The appeal attracted national attention because it raised important questions about the intersection of anti-vilification law, political communication and advocacy on women’s sex-based rights. This article examines how the case developed, the issues considered by the NSW Supreme Court, the outcome of the appeal, and what the judgment means for future advocacy and public debate.
From Social Media Posts to the Supreme Court
The litigation began in early 2023 during an increasingly public debate about the participation of trans-identified males in women’s community sport. At the time, Football NSW’s policies permitted trans-identified males to compete in women’s football competitions under certain circumstances, making the issue the subject of growing public discussion both in Australia and overseas.
Between January and March 2023, Kirralie Smith published a series of articles and posts on X (formerly Twitter) criticising the participation of trans-identified males in women’s football. Some publications identified Stephanie Blanch and Riley Dennis by name, while others referred to them through photographs, club affiliations or competition results.
Blanch and Dennis subsequently alleged that the publications breached sections 38R and 38S of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), claiming they were capable of inciting hatred, serious contempt or severe ridicule because they are transgender.
The proceedings were initially commenced in the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT). However, after the respondents challenged the constitutional validity of the legislation, the matters were transferred to the Local Court because NCAT does not have jurisdiction to determine constitutional questions.
The Local Court Decision
After hearing the evidence, the Local Court concluded that the publications amounted to unlawful transgender vilification.
The Court found that the publications were capable of inciting hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of Stephanie Blanch and Riley Dennis because they are transgender. It also rejected the statutory public interest defence, concluding that although the publications concerned an issue of legitimate public debate, repeatedly identifying and targeting the applicants went beyond what was reasonably necessary for that discussion.
The Local Court awarded compensatory damages of $55,000 to Stephanie Blanch and $40,000 to Riley Dennis. It also granted injunctions restricting future publications of a similar nature, ordered corrective notices to be published and made additional orders providing for default damages if certain orders were not complied with.
Kirralie Smith and Binary Australia appealed the decision to the NSW Supreme Court.
The Appeal
The appeal raised five principal issues:
- whether the publications amounted to unlawful transgender vilification;
- whether the statutory public interest defence applied;
- whether the transgender vilification provisions are compatible with the implied freedom of political communication recognised by the Australian Constitution;
- whether the compensatory damages awarded by the Local Court were excessive; and
- whether the injunctions, corrective notices and default damages orders were authorised by the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW).
The Supreme Court’s role was not to reconsider the broader policy debate surrounding women’s sport. Rather, it was required to determine whether the Local Court had correctly interpreted and applied the law.
What the Supreme Court Decided
The constitutional challenge
The appellants argued that sections 38R and 38S of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) impermissibly burden the implied freedom of political communication.
Justice Rigg rejected that argument, holding that the Court was bound by the NSW Court of Appeal’s decision in Sunol v Collier (No 2), which upheld the constitutional validity of comparable homosexual vilification provisions. Her Honour concluded that the reasoning in Sunol applied equally to the transgender vilification provisions and that subsequent High Court decisions had not displaced that authority.
Accordingly, the constitutional challenge failed.
Liability for unlawful vilification
The Supreme Court also upheld the findings of unlawful transgender vilification.
The Court confirmed that the statutory test is objective. The question is not whether a person intended to incite hatred, serious contempt or severe ridicule, but whether the publication, considered objectively and in its full context, was capable of producing that effect on the relevant audience.
The Court also rejected the appellants’ reliance on the statutory public interest defence. Although the publications concerned an issue of legitimate public debate, Justice Rigg concluded that repeatedly identifying Stephanie Blanch and Riley Dennis personally went beyond what was reasonably necessary to contribute to that discussion.
Damages and remedies
The Supreme Court upheld the compensatory damages awarded by the Local Court.
However, the appeal succeeded in part in relation to several of the remedies.
The Court narrowed the injunctions so they restrained only conduct of the same or similar effect as the publications found to constitute unlawful vilification. It also modified the wording of the corrective notices and reduced the period for which they were required to remain published.
Justice Rigg further concluded that the Local Court had exceeded its statutory powers when making the default damages orders under section 108(7) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW). Those orders were set aside and remitted for further consideration.
The Court also removed the costs order in the Blanch proceedings following agreement between the parties that it would not be enforced. Otherwise, each party was ordered to bear their own costs of the appeal.
Key Legal Principles
Although the decision turned on the specific facts of this case, it also clarifies several legal principles that are likely to influence future advocacy and litigation under New South Wales’ anti-vilification laws.
1. The statutory test is objective
Liability for unlawful transgender vilification does not depend on proving that a person intended to incite hatred, serious contempt or severe ridicule. The question is whether the publication, viewed objectively and in its full context, was capable of producing that effect on the relevant audience.
2. Political advocacy is not exempt from anti-vilification laws
The Court rejected the argument that political communication concerning women’s sport is automatically protected from the operation of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW). Participation in public debate does not, by itself, exempt a publication from anti-vilification laws.
3. The public interest defence has limits
The Court accepted that the publications formed part of an important public discussion about women’s sport. However, it concluded that repeatedly identifying Stephanie Blanch and Riley Dennis by name, photograph and other identifying details went beyond what was reasonably necessary for that discussion. Consequently, the statutory defence did not apply.
4. Courts must act within the powers granted by Parliament
Although the appeal was largely unsuccessful, the Supreme Court held that the Local Court exceeded the statutory powers conferred by the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) when making the default damages orders. That aspect of the decision reinforces the principle that judicial remedies must remain within the limits established by Parliament.
Conclusion
The decision in Smith v Blanch; Smith v Dennis provides important appellate guidance on the operation of New South Wales’ transgender vilification laws and the limits of the remedies available under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW).
For Women Speak Australia, the significance of this case extends beyond the parties involved. It demonstrates that advocacy on women’s sex-based rights increasingly operates within a complex legal environment, where questions of public policy, freedom of political communication and anti-vilification law intersect. Understanding that legal framework is essential for anyone engaged in respectful, informed and evidence-based public debate.
The Supreme Court resolved the legal issues before it, but broader questions concerning women’s sport, sex-based rights and the balance between anti-vilification protections and freedom of political communication remain matters for legislators, sporting organisations and the wider community.
Regardless of differing views on the outcome, Smith v Blanch; Smith v Dennis is likely to become an important reference point in future discussions about anti-vilification law, advocacy and women’s rights in Australia. Understanding what the Court decided—and equally importantly, what it did not decide—is essential to informed public debate.
Women Speak Australia publishes this analysis to assist public understanding of the legal framework within which advocacy for the sex-based rights of women and girls now takes place.